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Abstract
One of the key issues for understanding reciprocity is how people eval-
uate the kindness of an action. In this paper we argue that the moti-
vation driving an action plays an important role for the reciprocating
response to that action. We test experimentally the hypothesis that
reciprocal behavior is stronger in response to actions driven by in-
trinsic motivation, as opposed to extrinsic motivation. Our results
indicate that reciprocity is signiﬁcantly stronger when extrinsic moti-
vation can be ruled out, both at the aggregate and the individual level.
These ﬁndings suggest that models of reciprocal behavior should take
into account not only outcomes but also intentions and, in particu-
lar, motivations: the type of motivation of an action matters for its
perceived kindness and, as a consequence, for reciprocity.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
A large number of experimental and ﬁeld studies have indicated that eco-
nomic behavior is not always motivated by pure self-interest. In particular,
economic interactions are in many cases characterized by reciprocity: the
non-strategic conditional behavior to reward kind actions and to punish un-
kind actions, even if this is costly for the reciprocating subject (see e.g. Fehr
and Gachter, 2000, Sobel, 2004, and Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, for recent
surveys).
Among the main theoretical explanations of reciprocity, one class of mod-
els has focused on the properties of the outcomes of the actions one is re-
sponding to, as in the theories based on “inequity aversion” (e.g. Fehr and
Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). A second class of models has
e m p h a s i z e dt h er o l eo ft h eintentions determining the actions (e.g. Rabin,
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 1998; Charness and Rabin, 2000, Falk
et al., 2003).1
At the empirical level, many authors have examined the roles played by
outcomes and intentions in determining reciprocity. Experimental studies by
Charness (1996), Bolton et al. (1998), Oﬀerman (1999), and Cox (2000) have
found that the fairness of intentions has a relatively small impact on positive
reciprocity. Blount (1995) and Oﬀerman (1999) have shown that intentions
do play a signiﬁcant role for negative reciprocity. Falk et al. (2000) have
found that the attribution of fairness intentions has a large and signiﬁcant
impact on both positive and negative reciprocal behavior.
Most of this recent empirical literature has assessed the role of inten-
tions by considering experimental designs where the presence or absence of
intentions is used as the main treatment variable. In these studies, a con-
trol treatment where the sender can intentionally choose what action to take
among a set of alternatives (thus signalling her intentions) is generally com-
pared with a treatment where the sender cannot choose, either because she
does not have alternative options, as in McCabe et al. (2003), or because her
choice is determined exogenously, as in Blount (1995) and Falk et al., (2000).
In this paper we focus on the behavioral relevance of the nature of in-
tentions for reciprocity. More precisely, we consider the eﬀect that the mo-
tivation of an agent has on the reciprocating behavior of another agent. We
provide experimental evidence on whether the intrinsic (non-instrumental)
or extrinsic (instrumental) motivation of an action have diﬀerent eﬀects on
1Both intentions and outcomes matter for reciprocity in the model by Falk and Fish-
bacher (2006).
2the reciprocating response to that action.2 Our main hypothesis is that reci-
procity is stronger in response to actions that are perceived as driven by
intrinsic motivation, than in response to actions that are perceived as extrin-
sically motivated.3
In order to test this hypothesis, we examine experimentally a two-player
sequential move symmetric gift-exchange game. Our design is such that, in
one treatment, the ﬁrst mover can only be driven by intrinsic motivation,
while in the second treatment she can also be driven by extrinsic motivation.
The two treatments only diﬀer with respect to the nature of the intentions
of the ﬁrst mover, whereas the fairness of the outcome of the ﬁrst mover’s
action is kept constant across treatments. We expect positive reciprocity
to be stronger in the ﬁrst treatment, where the sender’s action can only be
perceived to be driven by intrinsic motivation, than in the second treatment,
where it can be perceived to be instrumental.
The results indicate that the type of motivation of an agent has a signif-
icant impact on other agents’ reciprocal behavior. When the experimental
design rules out the attribution of extrinsic motivation, second mover’s re-
sponses are characterized by signiﬁcantly stronger reciprocity. This result
holds both for strategy proﬁles and actual decisions, and both at the aggre-
gate and the individual level: a larger fraction of the subjects do not display
any reciprocal behavior when extrinsic motivation cannot be ruled out.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical mo-
tivation of the analysis. Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section
4 discusses the predictions to be tested. Section 5 presents the results. Sec-
tion 6 concludes with a discussion of the main ﬁndings and the implications
of the analysis.
2Following the psychological literature, in particular the Self Determination Theory
of Deci and Ryan (2000), “to be intrinsically motivated means to engage in an activity
because the activity itself is interesting and enjoyable” (Deci et al. 2007, p. 12). Behaviour
motivated by extrinsic motivation, instead, “entails doing an activity because it leads to
some outcome that is operationally separable from the activity itself. That is, extrinsic
motivation concerns activities enacted because they are instrumental rather than because
one ﬁnds the actions satisfying in their own right” (Deci et al. 2007, p. 13).
3In a diﬀerent perspective, Falk et al. (1999) refer to reciprocity as an intrinsic mo-
tivation, that is, as an “inherent willingness to respond in kind which is in principle
independent of extrinsic incentives” (p. 254).
32 Intrinsic Motivation and Reciprocity
In intention-based theories of reciprocity, agents reward actions that are per-
ceived to be kind and punish actions that are perceived to be unkind. One
consequence of the intention-based approach is that actions with identical
outcomes may elicit diﬀerent reciprocating responses depending on how they
are interpreted. The key issue for understanding reciprocity is therefore to
understand how people evaluate the kindness of a particular action. We ar-
gue that the type of motivation driving an action plays an important role for
the reciprocal response to that action.
Much empirical evidence is available about the motivational crowding-out
eﬀect:t h er e d u c t i o no fe ﬀort in activities carried out for intrinsic motiva-
tion when an instrumental reward, typically monetary, is introduced (e.g.
Cameron and Pierce, 1996, Eisenberger and Cameron, 1996, Deci et al., 2000,
Deci and Ryan, 2000). Self Determination Theory explains this phenomenon
using the concept of control (Deci and Ryan, 1985): extrinsic reward is per-
ceived as a form of control and, in intrinsically motivated people, it can
reduce eﬀort.4
Frey (1997) applied the concept of motivational crowding-out to eco-
nomics, examining the reduction of the eﬀort of intrinsically motivated work-
ers when the relationship is transformed from intrinsic-based to extrinsic-
based (typically, incentive-based). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) explored
the eﬀects of motivational crowding-out in an experiment on fund-raising:
the group of students not paid for collecting money performed better than
the group that, instead, was paid. At the theoretical level, Harvey (2005)
explained motivational crowding out within a principal-agent model where
utility is interpreted as overall satisfaction.5
Existing studies on motivational crowding-out have generally investigated
the diﬀerences in behavior motivated by intrinsic or extrinsic rewards within
t h es a m ep e r s o n . This research was not intended primarily to explore inter-
actions or, in particular, reciprocity.6 The intuition behind our study is to
4“Controlled regulation of behaviors is associated with poorer quality of performance
and a lack of persistence once the controlling contingencies are removed” (Deci et al., 2007,
p. 2).
5The role of intrinsic motivation for optimal incentive contracts was examined by Kreps
(1997) and Murdock (2002). See also the review in Lindenberg (2001).
6Reeve and Jang (2006) identiﬁed speciﬁc autonomy-supportive teaching practices and
found that these instructional behaviors, such as asking questions, being empathic, listen-
ing to students, being responsive to questions, encouraging students, providing positive
feedback, and oﬀering a meaningful rationale, were associated with students being more
autonomously engaged in learning. In contrast, teachers who were directive, used con-
4extend motivational crowding-out theory from “within person” to “between
persons”.
Following Falk and Fishbacher (2006), consider a utility function for agent
i that depends not only on material payoﬀs( πi), but also on a reciprocity
component, expressed as the product of a reciprocity parameter, a “kindness
t e r m ”a n da“ r e c i p r o c a t i o nt e r m ” :
Ui = πi + ρiφσ
The reciprocity parameter (ρi) represents the individual sensitivity to reci-
procity. The kindness term (φ) measures how kind an agent perceives the
action by another agent. The reciprocity term (σ)m e a s u r e st h ee ﬀect of the
reciprocal action on the agent’s utility.
We argue that the motivation driving an action is relevant for its perceived
kindness, so that the kindness term depends on the type of motivation driving
t h ea c t i o no n ei sr e s p o n d i n gt o .I np a r t i c u l a r ,f o rag i v e no u t c o m e ,a na c t i o n
is perceived to be more kind if it is genuine (intrinsically motivated, IM) than
if it is instrumental (extrinsically motivated, EM). This implies that φEM <
φIM or, alternatively, φEM =( 1− δ)φIM,w i t hδ > 0. As a consequence,
in an economic interaction, intrinsic motivation of the ﬁrst mover results in
stronger reciprocity of the second mover than extrinsic motivation.
We have designed an experiment in order to test this hypothesis (δ >
0). Our constituent game is a version of the gift-exchange game. In one
treatment, the motivation of the ﬁrst mover can only be perceived as intrinsic,
while in a second treatment it can also be perceived as extrinsic. If the
perceived kindness of an action is related to the nature of its motivation, we
would expect reciprocity to be stronger in the treatment where the sender’s
action can only be driven by intrinsic motivation, than in the treatment
where it can also be driven by extrinsic motivation.
3 Experimental design and procedures
Our experiment is based on a symmetric version of the gift-exchange game
(e.g. Fehr et al. 1993, Gachter and Falk, 2002). As illustrated below, this
game has the advantage of making it easier for the reciprocating subject to
interpret the nature of the other player’s intentions, whose eﬀect on reci-
procity is the core of our analysis. We start by describing the details of the
trolling language, asked controlling questions, and gave solutions rather than hints and
encouragement were experienced as autonomy diminishing. (Deci et al., 2007, 14).
5game, then present the two treatments, and ﬁnally illustrate the procedures
of the experiment.
3.1 The constituent game
We consider a two-player sequential move game that consists of two stages.
At the beginning of the game both players (A and B) are given an endowment
of 20 tokens. In the ﬁrst stage, player A must choose the amount a (an
i n t e g e rb e t w e e n0a n d2 0 )s h ew a n t st os e n dt op l a y e rB ;t h ea m o u n ts e n t
is subtracted from the payoﬀ of A, multiplied by 3 by the experimenter,
and added to the payoﬀ of B. In the second stage, player B must choose
t h ea m o u n t( a ni n t e g e rb e t w e e n0a n d2 0 )s h ew a n t st os e n dt op l a y e rA ;
the amount sent is subtracted from the payoﬀ of B, multiplied by 3 by the
experimenter, and added to the payoﬀ of A. Total payoﬀs are therefore 20−
a+3b for player A and 20−b+3a f o rp l a y e rB .F o re a c hp l a y e rt h em i n i m u m
and maximum potential payoﬀs are 0 and 80 tokens, respectively.
Information feedback is as follows. At the end of stage 1, each subject is
informed of her stage payoﬀ in tokens. At the end of stage 2 each subject is
informed of her stage payoﬀ in tokens and of her total payoﬀ in tokens and
in euros. At the beginning of the game subjects are informed that there is
no show-up fee, so that earnings are determined only by total payoﬀs, and
that the exchange rate is 2 tokens = 1 euro.
A number of features of this game are intended to facilitate the recipro-
cating subject’s interpretation of the other player’s motivation. First, sym-
metry in the endowments eliminates the confounding eﬀects of distributional
aspects, that may arise for example in a trust game: since both players have
the same endowment, inequality aversion cannot determine A’s decision (it
can motivate B’s decision but, as explained below, in exactly the same way
in the two treatments). Second, symmetry in the actions of the two players
greatly simpliﬁes the reciprocating subject’s task of reading the other player’s
mind in order to interpret her motives. Third, the structure of the game is
extremely simple, so as to enhance the saliency of the treatment.
3.2 Treatments
The treatment variable is the information set of the players. In the informa-
tion treatment (I-treatment), before playing stage 1 all subjects (A and B)
are informed that there will be a stage 2 that will be played with the same
rules as in stage 1 but with reversed roles. Therefore, this is simply a version
6of the standard gift-exchange game. In the no-information treatment (NI-
treatment), only after stage 1 has ended players (A and B) are informed that
there will be a stage two where the same action will be taken with reversed
roles. In this case, stage 1 is played as if it was the whole game, and stage 2
is played as a surprise sub-game.7
The two treatments diﬀer with respect to the motivations that may deter-
mine A’s action in stage 1. In the I-treatment, A can give tokens to B for pure
altruism and/or because she trusts that B will reciprocate, thus increasing
her own overall payoﬀ. Player A’s motivation, can therefore be perceived by
player B as intrinsic but also extrinsic (that is, aimed at achieving a higher
payoﬀ through B’s reciprocating response). In the NI-treatment, instead,
A cannot give to B in order to obtain something else, given that stage 1 is
played as if the game should then end. In this case player A’s motivation
can only be perceived by B as intrinsic.
Note that since all players receive the same information, in stage 2 players
B are fully aware of the motivation driving players A’s actions in stage 1.
Given that in stage 2 players B have to take exactly the same action as
players A in stage 1, it is particularly simple for them to interpret the nature
of A’s intentions in each of the two treatments. Since all other conditions
are kept ﬁxed, any diﬀerences in the reciprocating behavior of players B can
be interpreted as the eﬀect of the diﬀerences in player A’s motivation.
It is important to observe that in both treatments the response of player B
can only be driven by intrinsic motivation: since the game ends after player
B’s action, there is nothing “external” to be reached by her action. As a
consequence, our analysis can be interpreted as a test of an inter-personal
version of the motivational crowding out hypothesis: the extrinsic motivation
of the ﬁrst mover may crowd-out the intrinsically motivated reciprocating
behavior of the second mover.
3.3 Procedures
We applied a variant of the strategy method in stage 2, when players B have
to make their choice: player B had to provide a response for each feasible
action of player A, before being informed of the actual choice of A (strategy
method, henceforth SM). This allowed us to study the responses to each
7Note that subjects are simply given instructions about stage 1, without any explicit
reference to the game ending thereafter, so that subjects are not in any way cheated by
the announcement of stage 2. On the other hand, there is no reason why, when playing
stage 1, subjects should expect stage 2 to follow. See the instructions in the appendix for
details.
7possible action of A and therefore, on the basis of responses to diﬀerent
actions of A, to distinguish between unconditional altruism and conditional
altruism (reciprocity) in the strategies of B players. It is important to observe
that the speciﬁc features of the NI-treatment, based on a surprise stage 2,
imply that we cannot observe repeatedly subjects’ reciprocating behavior
over successive periods. This makes the application of the strategy method
particularly appropriate in order to investigate reciprocal behavior within
our experimental design.
After giving a response for each feasible action of player A, players B
were informed of the actual action taken by A and had to provide a response
(decision method, henceforth DM). Before players B made their choices with
the two methods (SM and DM), all players were informed that the payoﬀs
would be determined on the basis of one of the two methods, to be selected
randomly by publicly tossing a coin. After players B had made their decisions
in both SM and DM, the method to determine the payoﬀs was selected on
the basis of the outcome of the coin toss.8
This procedure based on responses by players B in both strategy and
decision method allowed us to ensure that in the I-treatment players A could
choose their action in stage 1 knowing that in stage 2 players B would choose
their action having been informed of the actual action taken by A in stage 1
(thus making salient the extrinsic motivation). It also allowed us to compare
the consistency between the strategies of B players and their actual responses.
We run two sessions for each treatment, with 24 subjects participating in
each session, for a total of 96 subjects. In each of the four sessions, subjects
were randomly assigned to a computer terminal at their arrival and, before
the game started, to their role as player A or B (each subject only played
one role). To ensure public knowledge, instructions were distributed and read
aloud (see Appendix 1). To ensure understanding of the experimental pro-
cedures, sample questions were distributed. Answers were privately checked
and, if necessary, explained to the subjects, and the experiment did not start
until all subjects had answered all questions correctly.
4 Predictions
If it is common knowledge that all subjects are self-interested and rational,
players B will choose to give zero tokens in both treatments, since they are
second movers and gift-giving is costly. In the I-treatment, by backward
induction, the optimal choice of players A is to give zero in stage one. In
8See Fischbacher et al. (2001) for a similar approach.
8the NI-treatment, the optimal choice of players A is again to give zero, since
they play as if they were at the terminal node of the game. Therefore, in
both treatments the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is for all players
to give zero: player A will choose a =0a n dp l a y e rBw i l lc h o o s eb =0 .
If subjects’ behavior is characterized by positive reciprocity, so that they
reward kind actions even if this is costly and cannot be strategic, in both
treatments the response of players B should depend positively on the amount
sent by player A:
Hypothesis 1. Reciprocity: The amount sent by B in stage 2
is positively related to the amount sent by A in stage 1.
Our operational deﬁnition of reciprocity is based on the Spearman corre-
lation coeﬃcient between the amounts sent by A and B, rather than Pearson
correlations, so as to avoid restricting the attention to linear dependence.9
Nevertheless, in order to enable a comparison of the two indicators, in pre-
senting the results we will also report Pearson correlation coeﬃcients.
Note that if some players are motivated by reciprocity, and this is common
knowledge, then the predictions for players A will diﬀer in two treatments.
In particular, players A should send more in the I-treatment, since they
might be motivated not only by pure generosity, but also by the trust that
a reciprocating response could increase their own payoﬀ. This is a further
reason why the focus of our analysis is mainly on the responses of players
B in the strategy method: this allows us to compare the two treatments,
characterized by diﬀerent types of ﬁrst mover’s motivation, while controlling
for diﬀerences in the sending behavior of players A. Nevertheless, we also
analyse reciprocity in the actual responses of players B (decision method) in
order to provide a check of the robustness of our results.
Let us turn to the main hypothesis of the paper. In a relationship between
a ﬁrst mover and a second mover, if the action of the ﬁrst mover is perceived
by the second mover as extrinsically motivated, positive reciprocity is elicited
less strongly than if the action is perceived as intrinsically motivated. In
our design, if reciprocity is motivated only by the fairness of outcomes (e.g.
inequity aversion), the positive relationship between the amounts sent by
A in stage 1 and by B in stage 2 should be the same across treatments.
9Note that if, for example, reciprocity was motivated only by inequality aversion, this
could imply a linear relationship between b and a, so that Pearson correlations could be
used as an appropriate indicator of reciprocating behaviour. However, if reciprocity is
motivated also (or only) by the fairness of intentions, the relationship between b and a is
not necessarily linear, so that a non-parametric indicator such as the Spearman correlation
is more appropriate.
9On the contrary, if the motivation of an action matters for its perceived
kindness, such relation could be diﬀerent across treatments. In particular, if
an action driven by extrinsic motivation is perceived as less kind than the
same action driven by intrinsic motivation, then the positively reciprocating
behavior of the responder should be stronger in the NI-treatment, where
extrinsic motivation can be ruled out, than in the I-treatment, where extrinsic
motivation cannot be ruled out.
Hypothesis 2. Eﬀect of motivation on reciprocity: The
positive relation between the amounts sent by A in stage 1 and
by B in stage 2 should be stronger in the NI-treatment than in
the I-treatment.
5R e s u l t s
The experiment was conducted in the Experimental Economics Laboratory
of the University of Milan Bicocca in January 2007. Participants were un-
dergraduate students of Economics recruited using an email list of voluntary
potential candidates. None of the subjects had participated previously in
trust or gift-exchange games. Sessions lasted approximately forty ﬁve min-
utes. No show-up fee was paid and the exchange rate between the tokens and
the euro was 2 tokens = 1 euro. The average payment was 14.9 euros, and
payments ranged between 0 and 40 euros. The experiment was run using the
experimental software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
Figures 1 to 3 display the histogram and the corresponding cumulative
distributions, by treatment, for a and for b in both SM and DM. Table 1
reports median amounts sent, by treatment, for players A and for players B
in both SM and DM. The median amount sent by A players is 3 tokens in
the NI-treatment (mean=4.46). This suggests that players A are not driven
purely by self interest, as they give almost 25 per cent of their endowment
on average. The median amount sent by players A is 6.5 tokens in the I-
treatment (mean=7.63). The diﬀerence between the two treatments indicates
that self interest also plays a substantial role in determining the decisions
of players A. The diﬀerence in the median of the distributions in the two
treatments is statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level, using a Mann-
Whitney U-test for the relevant one-sided hypothesis. The median response
by players B in strategy method is the same in the two treatments (4 tokens),
whereas the median response in decision method is 0 in the NI-treatment
and 1.5 in the I-treatment. In either case there are no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between the two treatments.
10Table 1: Median amount sent by treatment and signiﬁcance of diﬀerences
I NI U-stat P-val Nobs-I Nobs-NI
Amount sent by A 6.50 3.00 1.90 0.06 24 24
Amount sent by B (SM) 4.00 4.00 -0.28 0.78 504 504
Amount sent by B (DM) 1.50 0.00 1.08 0.28 24 24
Note: I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment.
The ﬁgures reported in table 1 indicate that the diﬀerences in the distribu-
tion of responses by B players under the two decision methods are consistent
with the hypothesis of reciprocal behavior: considering the strategy method,
where diﬀerences in sending behavior by A’s are controlled for, the median
response by players B is the same in the two treatments; focusing on the
decision method, where the B players respond to diﬀerent amounts sent by
A’s, median responses are higher in the treatment where A’s median input
is higher (I-treatment).
Let us therefore turn to the test of hypothesis 1 (reciprocity). Table 2
reports correlation coeﬃcients between the responses of B’s and the amounts
sent by A’s, within each treatment. If we consider the strategy proﬁles of
B players (responses in strategy method), the Spearman correlation coeﬃ-
cients are positive and strongly signiﬁcant within each of the two treatments
(0.35 and 0.52 for the I- and NI-treatment, respectively). Similar results are
obtained for Pearson correlation coeﬃcients (0.37 and 0.46 for the I- and
NI-treatment, respectively). These results clearly indicate that players B’s
strategies are characterized by reciprocity.
Table 2: Reciprocity within treatments
I( S M ) N I( S M ) I( D M ) N I( D M )
Spearman correlation 0.35 0.52 0.57 0.76
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pearson correlation 0.37 0.46 0.53 0.70
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
Note: I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment.
It is possible to argue that reciprocal behavior could be enhanced by the
use of the strategy method: given that players B are faced with a choice for
each of the feasible actions of players A, this might artiﬁcially lead to stronger
reciprocity than if players B were to make only one choice, in response to the
single actual decision made by A. It could also be argued, more generally,
11that given that only 1 of the 21 feasible actions by players A has actually
been chosen, the strategy proﬁle of players B as expressed in their SM choices
does not necessarily represent how they would respond to the actual choice of
player A. We therefore also report, in table 2, correlation coeﬃcients for the
responses of B’s to the actual amounts sent by A’s (decision method), for the
two treatments. The correlations are, as in the previous case, positive and
strongly signiﬁcant within each of the two treatments, and are indeed larger
than in the case of SM responses (0.57 and 0.76 for I- and NI-treatment,
respectively). Pearson correlations are 0.37 and 0.46, respectively, in the two
treatments.
Result 1: The null hypothesis of no reciprocity can be strongly
rejected within each of the two treatments, both for strategies
and actual decisions.
T h er e s u l t si nt a b l e2p r o v i d eaq u a l i t a t i v ei n d i c a t i o nt h a t ,a se x p e c t e d ,
the strength of reciprocity is diﬀerent in the two treatments: correlation
coeﬃcients are larger in the NI-treatment, where extrinsic motivation can be
ruled out. We therefore turn to formal tests of hypothesis 2. We start by
analyzing aggregate behavior using regression analysis.
Table 3 reports the results obtained by regressing the SM response of B
on A’s action, using observations from both treatments. We also include a
dummy variable for the NI-treatment and an interaction term (A’s action
multiplied by the NI-treatment dummy). This allows us to assess the diﬀer-
ences in reciprocating behavior between the two treatments at the aggregate
level. We deﬁne a kind response as sending a positive number of tokens and
an unkind response as sending zero tokens, so that players’ actions are deﬁned
as binary variables. The parameters are estimated with a probit estimator,
and test statistics are based on errors clustered on pairs of subjects.
The results for model (1), where both players’ actions are deﬁned as bi-
nary variables, indicate that the probability that B players respond kindly
is signiﬁcantly higher if player A’s action in stage 1 was kind. More im-
portantly, the coeﬃcient for the interaction term is positive and signiﬁcant
at the 1 per cent level using the relevant one-sided test, indicating that re-
ciprocal behavior is stronger in the NI-treatment. The results for model
(2), where only players B’s actions are deﬁned as binary variables, indicate
that the probability that B players respond kindly depends positively on the
amount received by A in stage. As in the previous case, the coeﬃcient for
the interaction term is positive and strongly signiﬁcant, consistently with the
hypothesis that reciprocal behavior is stronger in the NI-treatment.
12Table 3: Regressions of B’s responses to A’s actions (SM)
(1) (2)
Amount sent by A (binary) 1.65**
(4.75)
Amount sent by A (binary) * NI-treatment dummy 0.80*
(1.61)
Amount sent by A 0.04**
(3.12)
Amount sent by A * NI dummy 0.10**
(2.69)





Number of observations 1008 1008
Note: Dependent variable: binary response by B (SM), probit estimates. t-statistics
reported in brackets (standard errors clustered on subjects’ pairs). * indicates p<0.05,
** indicates p<0.01. I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment.
Since players B had to provide a response for each feasible action of
player A, we can also study the diﬀerences in reciprocating behavior between
the two treatments at the individual level. Figure 4 displays the histogram
of the Spearman correlations in the two treatments, and the corresponding
cumulative distributions. Table 4 reports individual correlation coeﬃcients
between the responses of B’s and each of the possible amounts sent by A’s, for
each of the two treatments. The coeﬃcients are sorted in ascending order,
and probability values are reported to assess their statistical signiﬁcance.
Both the table and the ﬁgures clearly indicate that individual correlations
are larger in the NI-treatment.
Table 5 reports the results of the test of the null hypothesis that the distri-
butions of correlation coeﬃcients are the same in the two treatments. In par-
ticular, using a t-test, the null hypothesis of equal means across treatments
is strongly rejected (p-value = 0.03 for a one- sided test, for both Spearman
and Pearson correlation). Using a Mann-Whitney U-test, as suggested by
the nature of the distribution of the correlation coeﬃcients and the small
sample size, also leads to rejection at the 10 per cent signiﬁcance level (the
p-values for a one-sided test are 0.10 for the Spearman correlation and 0.8
for the Pearson correlation coeﬃcients, respectively). Kolmogorov-Smirnov
13Table 4: Individual Spearman correlations, by treatment
I-treatment (P-value) NI-treatment (P-value)
Pair 1 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00
Pair 2 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.62
Pair 3 0.00 1.00 0.23 0.32
Pair 4 0.00 1.00 0.37 0.10
Pair 5 0.00 1.00 0.48 0.03
Pair 6 0.00 1.00 0.74 0.00
Pair 7 0.07 0.78 0.76 0.00
Pair 8 0.17 0.47 0.78 0.00
Pair 9 0.35 0.12 0.87 0.00
Pair 10 0.61 0.00 0.90 0.00
Pair 11 0.61 0.00 0.93 0.00
Pair 12 0.68 0.00 0.96 0.00
Pair 13 0.84 0.00 0.97 0.00
Pair 14 0.92 0.00 0.98 0.00
Pair 15 0.94 0.00 0.98 0.00
Pair 16 0.95 0.00 0.98 0.00
Pair 17 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 18 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 19 1.00 0.00 0.99 0.00
Pair 20 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 21 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 22 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 23 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Pair 24 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Note: I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment. Correlation
coeﬃcients are sorted by size.
14test-statistics do not lead to reject the null of equality of distributions, but
provide an indication that the whole distribution of correlations in the NI-
treatment dominates the corresponding distribution for the I-treatment.
Table 5: Test for diﬀerences in distributions of correlations
T-stat P-val U-stat P-val KS-stat P-val
Spearman correlation -1.88 0.03 -1.28 0.10 0.29 0.13
Pearson correlation -1.86 0.03 -1.43 0.08 0.29 0.13
Note: t h et a b l er e p o r t sr e s u l t so ft h et e s to ft h enull hypothesis that the distributions of
correlations coeﬃcients are the same in the Information treatment and the No
Information treatment.
These ﬁndings clearly indicate that, at the individual level, reciprocity is
stronger in the NI-treatment. Individual strategy proﬁles, reported in ﬁgures
5 and 6, help to explain this result: not only do subjects reciprocate more
on average in the NI-treatment, but also a larger fraction of the subjects
do not display any reciprocal behavior when extrinsic motivation cannot
be ruled out. In the I-treatment, 6 out of 24 responding subjects display an
unconditional strategy proﬁle (zero correlation with A’s decision), as opposed
to only 1 out of 24 in the NI-treatment.
Result 2: Reciprocity is signiﬁcantly stronger in the NI-treatment
than in the I-treatment, both at aggregate and individual level.
Finally, we check the robustness of the results by examining whether
there are any systematic diﬀe r e n c e si nh o ws u b j e c t sr e s p o n di ns t r a t e g ya n d
decision method in the two treatments. Table 6 reports regression results for
the relationship between B players’ actual decisions on their strategies: B’s
responses in DM are regressed by OLS on B’s responses in SM corresponding
t ot h es a m ea m o u n tg i v e nb yA .
The results indicate that strategies explain about 64 per cent of the overall
variability of decisions. The coeﬃcient for strategies is positive and signif-
icant in both treatments (0.73 and 0.94). The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients
between the two treatments indicates that the decisions follow the strategies
more closely in the NI-treatment, but is not statistically signiﬁcant. This
provides further evidence that the results reported above for the tests of the
hypothesis that the nature of motivations matters for reciprocating behavior
are not aﬀected by the use of the strategy method.
15Table 6: Regressions of B’s responses on B’s strategies
Response by B (DM)
B’s strategy 0.73**
(6.41)







Number of observations 48
Note: OLS estimates. t-statistics reported in brackets. * indicates p<0.05, ** indicates
p<0.01. I = Information treatment. NI = No Information treatment.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presented an experimental investigation of the hypothesis that
the motivation of an action matters for its perceived kindness, so that recip-
rocating responses may diﬀer depending on whether an action is perceived
as driven by intrinsic or extrinsic motivation. By extending the concept of
motivational crowding-out to interpersonal relations and, in particular, eco-
nomic interactions, we argued that extrinsic motivation by an agent may
weaken the responding agent’s reciprocal behavior.
In order to test this hypothesis, we designed a gift-exchange game where,
in one treatment, the ﬁrst mover can only be driven by intrinsic motivation,
while in the second treatment she can also be driven by extrinsic motivation,
while the fairness of the outcome of the ﬁrst mover’s action is kept constant
across treatments. Our results indicate that when extrinsic motivation can be
ruled out, reciprocal responses are indeed stronger. This ﬁnding holds both
for strategy proﬁles and actual decisions, and both at the aggregate and the
individual level. These results suggest several implications and directions for
future research.
First, at the theoretical level, reciprocity cannot be explained by models
that focus only on the outcomes of the actions one is responding to. Theo-
retical models of reciprocal behavior should also take into account intentions
and, in particular, consider explicitly the type of motivation driving an ac-
tion: an action may elicit reciprocity diﬀerently depending on whether it is
perceived as driven by intrinsic or extrinsic motivation.
16A second implication is related to the power of disinterested philanthropy
in eliciting reciprocity in helped people (Margalit, 1982): is free riding less
strong when people are engaged in mutual advantageous actions (like con-
tracts), or when the helped person feels disinterested motivation in her part-
ner? In other words, in a “Samaritan dilemma” (Buchanan, 1976), does gra-
tuity induce more or less reciprocity than a contract (without enforcement)?
Our experiment suggests that disinterested gifts elicit more reciprocity.
A third implication refers to interpersonal relationships, in particular
within organizations. The literature on motivational crowding-out indicates
that the introduction of instrumental incentives in domains where intrinsic
motivation are at work can reduce eﬀort and eﬃciency. If disinterested costly
actions generate relatively more reciprocity, then it can be more eﬃcient in
workplaces, for instance, not to assign all interpersonal relations to contracts
and incentives, but to leave some room for gratuity as a way to stimulate
reciprocity and, as a consequence, cooperation. This would apply, in particu-
lar, to those domains where stakeholders ask for intrinsic motivation, such as
value-based organizations, the non-proﬁt sector, or caring. In such domains,
to replace genuine relationality with contracts can reduce reciprocity. Our
experiment can, therefore, oﬀer new evidence and, possibly, theoretical hints
for understanding such crowding-out phenomena.
177 Appendix: Instructions
This appendix reports the instructions distributed on paper to the subjects.
Paragraph headings indicate in brackets if the given subsection is common
to both treatments or is speciﬁc to the relevant treatment.
Instructions [common to both treatments]
• Welcome and thanks for participating in this experiment.
• During the experiment you are not allowed to talk or communicate in
any way with other participants. If at any time you have any questions
raise your hand and one of the assistants will come to you to answer it.
• By following the instructions carefully you can earn an amount of
money that will depend on your choices and the choices of other par-
ticipants.
• At the end of the experiment the tokens that you have earned will
be converted in euros at the exchange rate 2 tokens = 1 euro. The
resulting amount will be paid to you in cash.
General rules [common to both treatments]
• There are 24 subjects participating in this experiment.
• At the beginning of the experiment 12 couples of two participants will
be formed randomly and anonymously. Within each couple, the two
subjects will be randomly assigned two diﬀerent roles: A and B.
• Therefore, each subject will interact exclusively with the other subject
in her pair, without knowing her/her identity, and will have the role (A
or B) assigned to him with equal probability at the beginning of the
experiment.
How players interact [NI-treatment]
• Both A and B will receive an endowment of 20 tokens each.
• Player A will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20) to
send to player B.
• We will triple the amount sent, so that B will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by A.
18• Therefore:
— A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B;
— B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A.
How players interact [I-treatment]
• Both A and B will receive an endowment of 20 tokens each.
The experiment will take place in 2 phases.
• PHASE 1
— Player A will have to decide how many tokens (between 0 and 20)
to send to player B.
— We will triple the amount sent, so that B will receive 3 tokens for
each token sent by A.
• PHASE 2
— Subject B, having been informed of the amount sent to him by
Player A in phase 1, will have to decide how many tokens (between
0 and 20) to send to player A.
— We will triple the amount sent, so that A will receive 3 tokens for
each token sent by B.
• Therefore, in total:
— A will obtain 20 tokens minus the tokens sent to B in phase 1 plus
3 times the tokens sent by B in phase 2.
— B will obtain 20 tokens plus 3 times the tokens sent by A in phase
1 minus the tokens sent to A in phase 2.
19Instructions - phase 2 [common to both treatments]
• Bh a st od e c i d eh o wm a n yt o k e n s( b e t w e e n0a n d2 0 )t os e n dt oA ,
who sent a certain amount of tokens to B in phase 1.
• We will triple the amount sent, so that A will receive 3 tokens for each
token sent by B.
• The choice of how many tokens B wants to send to A will be made with
two diﬀerent methods:
— Method 1: before being informed of how many tokens A sent to B
in phase 1, B has to decide how many tokens she wants to send
to A for each of the possible amounts that A could have sent to
him (0,1,...,20 tokens). Since there are 21 possible cases, B has
to make 21 choices.
— Method 2: after being informed of how many tokens A actually
s e n tt oBi np h a s e1 , B has to decide how many tokens she wants
to send to A.
• After B players have made their choice with both methods, earnings
will be determined on the basis of one of the two methods, selected
randomly.
— If method 1 is selected, of the 21 choices that B had made, only
the one corresponding to the actual decision of A will be used to
determine the earnings.
— If method 2 is selected, the single choice that B had made will be
used to determine the earnings.
The experiment will end and overall earnings for each subject will be
determined as the sum of the earnings obtained in phase 1 and in phase 2.
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